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Chapter 1
Introduction
Public-key certificates are becoming increasingly important in today's electronically
linked world. They are essential for data encryption, digital signatures, secure elec-
tronic commerce, and a host of other applications. In order for public-key certificates
to be deployed in a large, distributed community such as the Internet, there needs
to be a public-key infrastructure that allows the public-keys of others to be found
securely. While there are existing proposals for public key infrastructures, some of
which are already used in practice, many of them are complex and inadequate, and
to date, the development of a widely used public-key infrastructure has been slow.
SDSI (Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure, pronounced "sudsy") [8] is a
proposal by Ronald Rivest and Butler Lampson that has been recently put forward
in an attempt to address some of the problems of existing public-key schemes, as well
as present some new ideas for implementing a large-scale public key infrastructure.
It provides a simple design which uses linked local name spaces rather than a global,
hierarchical one. It also specifies ways of defining groups and writing access control
lists. This thesis is part of the work involved in an initial implementation of SDSI.
It presents a World Wide Web-based user interface that allows users to interact with
their SDSI servers and public-key certificates to carry out many of the functions
described in the SDSI proposal. The SDSI user interface (UI) is built upon the
library written by Matt Fredette as part of "An Implementation of SDSI" [5].
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides some background information about public-key
cryptography and certificates, which is needed to understand the theoretical basis for
SDSI, and this thesis work. It also gives brief descriptions of some of the existing
public-key infrastructure schemes, as well as some of the more recent proposals.
Chapter 3 presents an overview of SDSI, which is needed to provide a reference
for the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 describes the design of the SDSI UI, and the reasons behind some of
the design choices. It also contains diagrams of some of the screens that a SDSI user
might encounter when using the UI.
Chapter 5 describes some of the key steps involved in implementing the user
interface.
Chapter 6 gives a discussion of possible future expansions to this work, and also
outlines some of the developments of the next version of SDSI. Chapter 7 ends with
a conclusion.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter gives a brief introduction to public key cryptography, public-key cer-
tificates, and some of the previous work that has been done in this area. A more
detailed presentation of this material can be found in the book "Secure Electronic
Commerce" [4] or in a recent article in "Byte" [9].
2.1 Public-Key Cryptography
If two parties want to exchange information secretly, the sender can transform the
data using a cryptographic algorithm through a process called encryption. The data
that is input to the process is called plaintext, and the output is called ciphertext.
The receiver can invert the encryption by a decryption process, to retrieve the original
plaintext. Both encryption and decryption require a key as a parameter. In a sym-
metric encryption scheme, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption.
This key is kept secret from everyone except the sender and receiver. In an asymmet-
ric or public-key encryption scheme, two different but mathematically related keys
are used for encryption and decryption. One, called the private key, is kept secret,
known only to its owner. The other key is made known publicly, hence the term
public-key cryptography. Data can be encrypted with the private key and decrypted
with the corresponding public key, and vice versa.
2.2 Digital Signatures
Public-key cryptography can be used to create digital signatures of messages. A user
can digitally sign data by encrypting it with the private key of his public-private key
pair. This signature is sent along with the message. Anyone else can then use the
public-key of that user to decrypt the signed data, and check that the result of the
decryption and the message that was sent, are equal. Usually, for efficiency, instead of
encrypting the actual message, a hash of the message is computed, and the resulting
hash value is signed. The verifier can then decrypt the hashed message with the
signer's public key, independently compute a hash of the message (using the same
hash function as the signer), and then check whether these two results are equal. If
they are, he knows that the owner of the public-key signed the message, and that the
message was not changed in any way during transmission.
2.3 Traditional Public-Key Certificates and In-
frastructures
This section describes the traditional model of public-key infrastructures. It also gives
a brief description of two schemes that essentially use this model, X.509 and PGP.
A public-key certificate is a data structure that has been traditionally used to
bind a public-key to a particular individual, organization, or process. In this model,
a public-key certificate is digitally signed by the issuer of the certificate, i.e. the person
or entity that has confirmed the binding between the public-key and the holder of the
certificate.
When any entity wishes to verify the digital signature of another, it first needs
to obtain a copy of the public-key of the entity that made the signature. When this
occurs, it is important that the person obtaining the public-key is certain that this
public-key is actually the correct one for the party whose signature he is trying to
verify. If, for example, an adversary could substitute his own public-key for another
one, then that adversary could sign a message with his private key, claim the message
to be from someone else, and spoof the verifier into using his public-key for signature
verification. Then the verifier would accept a message from the adversary as coming
from someone else. Therefore, the whole security of digital signatures depends on the
binding of public-keys to the correct entities.
This problem can be easily solved among a small number of users who know each
other. Two people who want to exchange public-keys securely can do so, for example,
by swapping diskettes which hold their public-key values. As the set of users becomes
large and dispersed, however, this model becomes impractical. Public-key certificates
provide a solution to public-key distribution that is scalable and secure.
In order to use public-key certificates to obtain a user's public-key, a verifier must
obtain and validate that user's public-key certificate. One validates a certificate by
verifying the signature of the issuer of that certificate. This transforms the problem
of acquiring the public-key of a user into one of acquiring the public-key of the issuer
of that user's certificate. The issuer will also have a public-key certificate, and so
the process of certificate validation can be used recursively to develop a chain of
signatures. This process continues until the verifier finds a certificate signed with a
public-key that he knows and trusts. Then he can unwind the chain of certificates
by verifying the signatures on the certificates in the reverse order in which they were
obtained, until he can verify the certificate of the original user.
We have seen that public-key cryptography and digital signatures are essential
for the development of secure electronic communication. Public-key certificates are
the tools necessary to apply public-key technology. Public-key infrastructures (PKI)s
are the supporting structures that are needed to enable public-key technologies to be
used on a wide scale. When one tries to use and manage public-key certificates in the
real world, especially in very complex and diverse environments, many technological,
legal and other problems arise. These issues need to be addressed in order to see
public-key technologies used to their fullest potential. To date, the development of a
wide-spread public-key infrastructure has been very slow.
2.3.1 Existing Infrastructures
X.509. X.509 certificates [7] are the most widely used today. Their use includes the
MasterCard/Visa Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) infrastructure for Internet-
based bank card payments, the United States Federal Government, and the ICE-TEL
initiative in Europe. X.509 is based on the use of designated certification authori-
ties (CA)s that have the authority to sign public-key certificates for other entities,
verifying that this entity is indeed the holder of a certain public-key. X.509 also at-
tempts to assign a global "distinguished name" (DN) for individuals, organizations,
and applications. As an example, a DN might consist of the following: {C = US, S =
Massachusetts, L = Cambridge, 0 = ABC Inc., CN = Bob Jones}, where C represents
the country, S the state name, L the locality name, 0 the organization name, and CN
the common name of the individual. However, the recent X.509 version 3 standard
allows the use of other local names in certificates, mainly out of a realization that the
DN naming scheme was too constraining.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). Philip Zimmermann's PGP [10] is popular among
Internet users for encrypting and signing email. Each user chooses a name for his
public-key, which is usually his full name followed by an email address, such as Bob M.
Jones <bob@abc. com>. Any user can sign the public-key of another, vouching that
this is indeed that person's correct public-key. Users can also make decisions about
whether they trust other people to act as "introducers" for other PGP public-keys,
and how much they trust them. If the level of trust of the introducers of a certain
key reaches a certain threshold, that key will be accepted as valid. This scheme
allows users to employ a grass roots, "web of trust" method for obtaining and issuing
public-key certificates.
2.4 Newer Ideas about Public-Key Infrastructures
This section briefly presents some of the newer public-key certificate schemes that
have been proposed. Most of them move away from the traditional idea of binding
a public-key to a particular individual or entity by using that individual's "unique"
name.
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI). Proposed by the IETF working
group, and in particular, Carl Ellison, SPKI [3] is a recent (June, 1996) proposal
for a public-key infrastructure. SPKI certificates grant specific authorizations to
the subject of a certificate, which is a public-key, rather than an individual or other
entity. An example of such an authorization would be to allow a particular public-key
to telnet to a certain host using a particular username.
Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI). SDSI is the joint work
of Ronald Rivest and Butler Lampson. The SDSI proposal [8] (Sept., 1996) outlines
a public-key certification scheme that is simple and flexible, employing completely
local names, and using group definitions for access control. It is described in more
detail in Chapter 3.
PolicyMaker. Proposed by Blaze, Feigenbaum and Lacy (May, 1996), PolicyMaker
[2] is not strictly a public-key certificate scheme, but rather provides a generic lan-
guage for expressing trust relationships, policies and credentials, so that decisions can
be made about requests based on digitally signed messages.
As it can be seen from the descriptions above, there is still a lot of ground-
breaking research being done in this area, and there are many unanswered questions
about what the "right" approach is to solving the problem of deploying a secure,
wide-spread, easy to use public-key infrastructure.

Chapter 3
SDSI
3.1 Introduction
This chapter gives an overview of the first version of SDSI, SDSI 1.0, which is the
basis for the implementation work of this thesis. Much of it is derived from the paper
"SDSI - A Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure" [8].
SDSI's design provides a simple public-key infrastructure which uses linked local
name spaces rather than a global, hierarchical one. It also specifies ways of defining
groups and writing access control lists. Part of the motivation behind SDSI's creation
was a realization that while the traditional focus of public-key certificates has been on
name-key bindings, the real need is to have a way to build secure distributed systems.
Within this framework, access control is often the main problem i.e. deciding whether
a certain digitally signed request for a certain resource (e.g. an HTTP request for a
web page) should be granted. Given these facts, one of the aims of SDSI is to provide
access control lists (ACL)s that are easy to create and maintain. The following section
expands on the key points of SDSI.
3.2 Description of Key Features
Principals are Public Keys. Public-keys are central in SDSI. The idea of an
individual (person, process, or machine, etc) is not required, though of course such
individuals will control the private key associated with the public-key. However, the
most important thing about a principal is its ability to verify signed statements, and
this is why each SDSI principal is defined by its public key.
SDSI objects are represented by S-expressions, and so a public-key might be rep-
resented by the following data structure:
(Public-Key:
( Algorithm: RSA-with-SHA1 )
( N: =Gt802Tbz9HKm067= )
(E: #11 ) )
where the Algorithm: field specifies the algorithm that should be used to verify
the public-key (in this case RSA with the SHA1 hash function), N: gives a base-64
encoding of the RSA public modulus, and E: gives the hexadecimal value of the RSA
exponent.
A SDSI principal is made up of such a public-key along with one or more optional
Internet addresses. A principal might be represented by the following:
(Principal:
( Public-Key:
( Algorithm: RSA-with-SHA1 )
( N: =Gt802Tbz9HKm067= )
(E: #11 ) )
( Principal-At: "http://www.abc.com/cgi-bin/sdsi-server")
( Server-At: "http://www.xyz.com/cgi-bin/sdsi-server" ) )
The Principal-At: and Server-At: fields specify Internet addresses where queries
to the principal can be addressed, or certificates can be distributed on behalf of the
principal.
Every principal is a CA. One of the principal features of SDSI is that all public-
keys are equal. There is no hierarchical global infrastructure (though in practice some
principals might become more important than others). In particular, SDSI certificates
can be created and signed by any principal, not just certain designated certification
authorities, or "CA"s.
Local Name Spaces. Each principal in SDSI can create a local name space in
which it can bind other principals to any names it chooses. These names can be ar-
bitrarily chosen, perhaps derived from nicknames, email addresses, account numbers,
etc. Some example local names might be:
alice
bob-jones
account-12345
There is no fixed global name space in which each principal must be linked to a
unique name. The principal one user refers to as bob-jones may be different from
the principal another user refers to as bob-jones.
Principals assign values to the local names in their name spaces by issuing certifi-
cates, which are described in more detail later. The policies that a principal follows
when issuing certificates are totally up to that principal.
Linked Local Name Spaces. One of the most important contributions of SDSI
is the idea of linked name spaces. Though there is no global name space in SDSI,
principals can conveniently link their local name spaces in order to reach principals in
other name spaces. Each principal can export to others its binding of other principals
to names by issuing name/value certificates. Thus, if a user's local name bob refers
to some principal, then that user can refer to the principal that bob calls alice as
(ref: bob alice )
or, using syntactic sugar,
bob's alice
Bob exports his binding by issuing a name/value certificate which binds his local name
alice to alice's principal. This concept can be extended to longer references such as
bob' s alice' s eve, which is the syntactically sugared version of (ref : bob alice
eve). This reference is well-defined for a user if he has bound bob to some principal,
and that principal has in turn bound alice to another principal, which has in turn
bound eve to a third principal. Other examples of such extended references are:
Visa's account-123456789
mit's Ics's rivest
Harvard's faculty's joan
There can also be symbolic definitions in SDSI. For example, a user's local name
bob-jones can be defined to be mit's bob-jones, and so if mit changes the principal
it calls bob-jones, then the principal that user calls bob-jones will change as well.
Given these capabilities, a typical SDSI user will only need to obtain maybe 5-
20 public-keys and then obtain other principals by linking off these. However, the
process of accepting these initial 5-20 public-keys and binding them to local names
is very important, and should be done carefully and manually, making sure of the
correct public-key owner, and choosing a meaningful local name.
Certificates. There are four main types of certificates: Name/Value, Membership,
Delegation, and Autocert.
Name/Value Certificates. These certificates are the ones used to bind princi-
pals to local names, thereby exporting those bindings to the world. These certificates
must be signed by the issuer, using its public-key principal. An example certificate,
which binds a principal to the local name alice-brown is shown below:
(Cert:
( Local-Name: alice-brown )
( Value:
( Principal:
( Public-Key:
( Algorithm: RSA-with-SHA1 )
( N: =Gt802Tbz9HKm067= )
( E: #11 ) )
( Principal-At: "http://www.abc.com/cgi-bin/sdsi-server")
( Server-At: "http://www.xyz.com/cgi-bin/sdsi-server" ) )
( Description: "Alice-Brown is a friend of 5 years")
( Signed: ... ) )
The Signed: field will contain the signature on the certificate, with the date of sign-
ing, and an optional expiration date for the certificate. In addition, the actual signing
principal may be appended to the signature.
As described before, certificates may symbolically bind a local name to another
name. So, to define bob-j ones to be mit 's bob-j ones the following certificate would
be issued:
(Cert:
( Local-Name: bob-jones )
( Value: mit's bob-jones )
( Signed: ... ) )
Delegation Certificates. These certificates are used to authorize a group (of
servers) to be able to sign certificates on behalf of the signing principal. Delegation
certificates are meant to be used by SDSI servers to show that their signatures are
authorized by other principals, but there are also many other possible uses for them.
Delegation certificates have the following form:
(Delegation-Cert:
( Template: form )
( Group: group )
(Signed: ... ) )
This certificate authorizes every member of group to be able to sign objects matching
form. To give a more concrete example, the following certificate:
(Delegation-Cert:
( Template: (Membership.Cert: (Group: math_lovers ) ) )
( Group: server-group )
( Signed: ... ) )
gives the group server-group the authority to sign membership certificates for the
group mathlovers.
Membership Certificates. These are certificates that give principals member-
ship in a particular SDSI group. They will be described along with groups in a later
section.
The Autocert. An auto-certificate or Autocert is a special kind of certificate. It
is signed by the principal that the certificate is about, and has the type Auto-Cert:.
Every SDSI principal is required to have an Autocert. The only mandatory field is the
Public-Key field, but it may contain other information as well. Most of these fields
are there primarily for humans to read, and may be added at the user's discretion.
Since all of this information is signed by the principal itself, it should not be trusted
without suitable corroboration. An example of some of the fields an Autocert might
contain is given below:
(Auto-Cert:
( Public-Key: ... )
( Principal-At: "http://www.abc.com/cgi-bin/sdsi-server")
( Server-At: "http://www.xyz.com/cgi-bin/sdsi-server" )
( Local-Name: alice-brown )
( Description: "I am an employee of ABC, Inc." )
( Phone: 617-246-3579 )
( Email-address: alice@abc.com )
( Signed: ... ) )
In this case the Local-Name: field gives the principal's favorite nickname for
herself, which others may or may not use for this principal in their own name spaces.
The Description: field gives arbitrary text by the entity that controls the public-key
about herself.
Groups and ACLs. Another important feature of SDSI is its group definition
capability. A SDSI group is a set of principals, and each group has a name which is
local to some principal that is the "owner" of the group. Each SDSI principal can
define groups, and only the owner of the group can change the group definition. The
definition can list the group's members as explicit principals, or by name, or it can
define the group in terms of other groups. Some example group definitions are given
below:
( Group: bob alice fred )
( Group: ( AND: friends over-18 ) )
( Group: mit's faculty staff ( Principal: ... ) )
( Group: ( NOT: enemies ) )
Another simple group is the group containing everyone, which is denoted by ALL!.
To actually bind a group to a local name and export the definition, a name/value
certificate must be issued for the group. As an example:
(Cert:
( Local-Name: mathlovers )
( Value: ( Group: bob chris joan ) )
( Signed: ... ) )
Membership in a group can also be given to a principal without making an explicit
group definition by using membership certificates. The certificate below gives the
indicated Principal membership in the group friends:
( Membership.Cert:
( Member: ( Principal: ... ) )
( Group: friends )
( Signed: ... ) )
Groups are useful for creating access control lists, or "ACL"s. ACLs are used to
describe who is authorized to access certain data (e.g. a file) or perform certain op-
erations (e.g connect to a web server). Usually this authorization is done by defining
a group of authorized principals, and then placing the group name on an appropriate
ACL. This method is especially efficient when the same group of principals is autho-
rized on many different ACLs. Then to change authorizations, the group definition
can be updated with a single modification, without having to update the ACL. Also,
groups can be given meaningful names so that writing ACLs becomes simpler. Each
principal can define its own groups and export its definitions to others. Some groups
that might be useful in ACLs are given below:
friends
mit's chemistry-department's faculty
USA's over-18
ACLs are made up of a type and definition, where type determines the oper-
ation that is being controlled (e.g. read) and definiton is the group that is being
given the authority. As an example, the following certificate can only be read by the
group math_lovers:
( Cert:
( Local-Name: alice-brown )
( Value: ( Principal: ... ) )
( ACL: ( read: math_lovers ) )
( Signed: ... ) )
One ACL of special interest is (ACL: (read: ALL!) ) which allows anyone to read
the associated object.
On-line Internet orientation. SDSI assumes that principals that issue certifi-
cates can provide an on-line Internet service, or arrange to have one provided via a
designated server or servers. Each SDSI user will have a local cache which contains
all of his certificates, and his SDSI servers will have a mirror image of this collection.
A SDSI principal may sign certificates off-line and then have his servers distribute
them upon request. These servers would respond to and make queries, as described
in the next section. SDSI servers should have high reliability and on-line availability.
Queries. Queries are carried out and responded to by SDSI servers. The three
types of queries are Get, Membership, and Reconfirmation.
Get Queries. Get queries are the primary way by which the certificates of other
principals can be obtained. These certificates export the name/value bindings of that
principal and allow the linking of local name spaces to occur as described previously.
The Get query function is therefore a central one in SDSI, and it is carried out by
SDSI servers. Servers hold a database of certificates, and they can be queried to
return certificates that satisfy some criteria. The Get query always contains a To
field which specifies a principal, and the certificates that are returned must have that
principal as the primary signer. A Get query also specifies a Template which gives
the form of the desired certificates. Therefore, to get a certificate with the local name
jim issued by the indicated Principal, the following query would be composed:
(Get. Query:
( To: ( Principal: ... ) )
( Template: ( Cert: ( Local-Name: jim ) ) )
( Signed: ... ) )
Membership Queries. Membership queries are used to obtain membership
certificates. A principal can query a server to find out whether or not it is a member
of a particular group, and the server can respond with a membership certificate. The
reply to a membership query is either true, false, or fail. An optional Hint : may
be given in the fail case, explaining to the client how it can supply credentials (for
example membership certificates for other groups) that would eliminate the failure
the next time.
Reconfirmation Queries. SDSI does not have "certificate revocation lists" as
a means of revoking the signature on a previously signed object. Instead, signatures
may be designated as needing periodic reconfirmation. The signer can specify the
reconfirmation period that is appropriate for that signature: some signatures might
need to be re-confirmed yearly, while others might need reconfirmation hourly. SDSI
servers can make reconfirmation queries to find out whether the signature on a par-
ticular object has been reconfirmed.
Chapter 4
Design of the SDSI User Interface
The design and implementation of the SDSI UI was an iterative process, and in the
end, the design was re-worked several times. Initial implementations pointed out
certain flaws in the original design, so the design would be changed, which would
require a new implementation, and so on. This was somewhat to be expected given
that this user interface was the first of its kind for SDSI, which was a totally new
proposal, and the process proved to be a valuable learning experience. This chapter
describes the final design that was implemented in this thesis. Further re-working is
expected in order to produce a completely finished user interface.
4.1 Goals
The SDSI UI is meant provide each user with a way to manage his SDSI servers and
certificates. This will include functions such as creating certificates, querying other
servers for certificates, viewing certificates in his local cache, and editing his Autocert.
There are many different people who may want to use public-key certificates. The
range of sophistication of the user may go from a system administrator in charge of the
security of a large corporation, all the way to a person who casually uses public-key
certificates to authenticate email from friends.
The aim of this user interface is to make SDSI accessible to an average person who
has a basic knowledge of public-key cryptography, not just cryptographers and others
with advanced knowledge. It is envisioned that as time passes, a typical SDSI user
will accumulate many name/value certificates. After manually accepting the public
keys of a few individuals or entities (maybe 5-20 of them) and associating them with
local names, the user will be able to use SDSI's capability of linking name spaces to
obtain other certificates.
As an example, we consider the user Alice who has just enrolled as a student at
MIT. When Alice logs into her student account she generates a SDSI public-key, and
can start up the SDSI UI, using the password which protects the private part of her
key.1
One of the first things Alice will want to use the UI for is to create her Autocert,
which can contain information about herself in addition to her public-key.
Alice soon decides that she wants to be able to receive authenticated messages
from her high-school friend Bob, who now goes to Harvard. In order to do this,
she needs Bob's public-key, and so Alice and Bob decide to exchange public-keys by
placing their SDSI principals on diskettes and swapping them. Once she has the
diskette with Bob's key, and places the key in a file, Alice can load it in through
the UI and issue a certificate for Bob's key, perhaps giving it the local name MyBob.
Alice can also issue membership certificates for Bob's principal, for any group she
decides to create.
Next, Alice meets Chris through Bob, and wants to get his public-key. Bob emails
Alice, telling her that he has a certificate for Chris in his cache, under the local name
Chris-Smith. Alice has trust in Bob's judgement with respect to binding public-keys
to the correct entity. Therefore she decides to query Bob's SDSI server for Chris's
certificate. Her query will be input through the SDSI UI as MyBob' s Chris-Smith.
Alice can then issue a certificate for the public-key principal that is returned by the
query, again using the SDSI UI. She can chose any local name she wants for this
principal, perhaps Chris-Smith or MyChris.
'MIT currently uses X.509 public-key certificates to allow students to view their financial and
academic information via the World Wide Web.
Alice soon makes friends at MIT, and in particular she wants to obtain the public-
key of Eve, another student. Alice already has MIT's public-key principal and has
given it the local name MIT, and she knows that MIT has a certificate for Eve with
the local name Eve25. So, because she has faith in the reliability of MIT's SDSI
servers, she decides to create a certificate for Eve with the local name MyEve, binding
it symbolically to the value MIT' s Eve25.
As a final example, Alice wants to create a group called math_lovers, and she
plans to make certain files available for reading to the principals that are members of
this group. She can define the group using the SDSI UI.
The SDSI UI should enable Alice (or any other user) to perform all of the functions
listed above, as well as the other basic SDSI functions described in the SDSI proposal
[8]. In addition, the UI should be simple and easy to use, and should provide the user
with ample on-line support.
It should be noted that the SDSI UI is built upon the SDSI library written by
Matt Fredette as part of "An Implementation of SDSI" [5].
4.2 Type of Interface
An early design choice was to make the SDSI UI web-based. This requires each user
to have a World Wide Web browser that supports forms, such as Netscape. The
reasons for this choice are:
Familiarity to users. The World Wide Web is fast becoming one of the most
widely used services of the Internet. Web browsers such as Netscape provide a very
familiar interface to users, and will help contribute towards fulfilling the goals of ease
of use and accessibility of the SDSI UI.
Functionality. Most web browsers provide functionality such as image and postscript
viewing. This capability is useful because some SDSI certificates may contain image
files.
Availability. Web browsers are widely available and easily obtained, often for free.
This availability will make a web-based user interface accessible to a large number of
users on many different machine platforms.
Fits well with SDSI. As described previously, SDSI is designed with the intent
that principals will have highly available on-line servers that can make and respond
to queries. Having a web-based user interface seems to fit well with this Internet
orientation.
4.3 Functionality
This section describes how some of the pages of the SDSI UI work, and also gives
diagrams of these pages. It continues with the example of Alice and her friends,
showing how Alice would use the UI to accomplish her tasks.
The Autocert. When Alice first starts up the SDSI UI she encounters her SDSI
Homepage. Figure 4-1 contains a diagram of this first screen. Alice knows that she
needs to create an Autocert, so she goes first to the Manage Your Autocert page.
When this page appears, it displays Alice's public-key and gives her space to enter
other name/value fields that she would like to include. Figure 4-2 shows this screen,
along with some example information that Alice might enter about herself:
Email-address: alice@mit.edu
Description: "I am a first year student at MIT. I plan to major
in Math."
When Alice has completed all the fields she wants, she can click on the Sign button
to sign the Autocert and add it to her cache of certificates. The next time that
Alice enters the Manage Your Autocert page, it will display the information that
she entered.
Your SDSI Homepage
Welcome to SDSI! From this page you can interact with your SDSI servers and
public-key certificates to perform a variety of functions. Choose from the options
listed below. If at any time you need help using SDSI, click on HELP. New Users
may want to find out how to get started with SDSI.
Search, Issue, and Query
a Search for Principals 
s
a
Mar
Thes
a
This is the main SDSI page. From here you can search for SDSI public-key
principals both locally and remotely, as well as issue name/value,
membership, or delegation certificates for those that you find.
Define a Group
Use this option to name a group and place SDSI principals in that group.
iage Your Local Cache
e options operate only on your cache of certificates.
List Certain Certificates in Your Cache
List all the certificates of a certain type (e.g. all the membership certificates)
in your cache.
* Search Your Certificate Cache
Search your cache for certificates matching a particular template.
* Manage Your Autocert
View your Autocert or create a new one.
Figure 4-1: The SDSI Homepage
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Create Your Autocert
Enter jield foryour Autocert. Your Public-Key is aIrea•y there.
Enter the Name/Value pairs you want to include in your Autocert. You do this by
placing the Name of the field (example Phone) in the left-hand (or upper) box of
one of the pairs below, and the corresponding Value (example 456-1234) in the
right-hand (or bottom) box. Your Public-Key is already included, and should not
be edited. The help page can give you more information about Autocerts.
Sign]Rse
Figure 4-2: The Autocert
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Loading Principal from File. Alice then obtains a public-key principal from her
friend Bob, and places it in a file called bobkey. She wants to use this principal to
issue a certificate for Bob, so she goes into the Search for Principals and Issue
Certificates page of the SDSI UI. There she goes to the Search for Principals
section, selects the Filename option and types in the filename bob.key. Clicking on
Submit loads in the principal from the file and displays the results to Alice. Figure 4-3
shows the appearance of this screen.
Issue Name/Value Cert. Alice wants to continue by issuing a name/value certifi-
cate for Bob's public-key principal, so she goes to the Issue Certificates section
of the Search for Principals and Issue Certificates page and clicks on the
Issue Name/Value Cert link. This takes Alice to a page where she can enter the
local name that she wants to bind Bob's principal to, as well as an expiration date
for the certificate. Figure 4-4 shows this page while she is in the process of issuing
a certificate with the local name MyBob and expiration date December 31, 1998. If
Alice clicks on the Sign button, a certificate with these attributes will be signed by
her principal, and added to her cache.
Issue Membership Cert. After a while, Alice learns about SDSI groups and mem-
bership certificates, and she decides she wants to create a group called friends.
However, at this point she still considers Bob to be her only friend, so she decides to
issue a membership certificate for Bob. To do this she once again goes to the Search
for Principals and Issue Certificates page. There she selects the SDSI Name
option, and enters her local name for Bob's principal, MyBob. This time a certificate
is found, as shown in Figure 4-5. Alice will then choose the Issue Membership Cert
option, and enter information on the resulting page about the name of the group, and
also an expiration date for the certificate, similar to the name/value case in Figure 4-4.
Get Query. When Alice meets Chris later on, and wants to query Bob's server
for his principal, she can once again use the Search for Principals and Issue
Certificates page. Again, her query will also use a SDSI Name, but this time it will
Search for Principals and Issue Certificates
From this page you can search for SDSI public-key principals both locally and remotely, and issue
Name/Value or Membership certificates for those that you find. You can also issue Delegation certificates
and make Symbolic Definitions at any time.
Search For Principals
Search for a SDS princpal by entering a local name such as Alice, or an esrnded reference such as
Bob's Alice, or the name of a file which conioins a cerkficair or aprincipal There are also more
derlWed instwctions.
0 SDSI Name 0 Filename
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Principal Found:
Key is an RSA key:
Modulus:
#B8D1C7A2EBCE4EDDD346162129A40451999B28AC7747AC91139B6F12089D9A7E-
#6E0471936DBCC1EF1684C5769C4441681FC8FE81A6 F5003CD4A6B97AE394F489
Exponent:#11
Server-At: swan.lcs.mit.edu thrush.lcs.mit.edu
End of Principal
Issue Certificates
If you wish to issue a Name/Value certificate for this principal, click on
Issue Name/Value Cert
If you wish to issue a Membership certificate for this principal, click on
Issue MembershiD Cert
Figure 4-3: Search for Principals and Issue Certificates - Principal Found
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Issue a Name/Value Certificate
Principal Found:
Key is an RSA key:
Modulus:
#B8D1C7A2EBCE4EDDD346162129A40451999B28AC7747AC91139B6F 12089D9A7E-
#6E0471936DBCC1EF1684C5769C4441681FC8FE81A6F5003CD4A6B97AE394F489
Exponent:#11
Server-At: swan.lcs.mit.edu thrush.lcs.mit.edu
End of Principal
Issue a certificate for the above public-key which has the following attributes:
New Local Name:
Enter a name that you want to locally bind this public-key to
Expiration Date:
Enter an expiration date of the form yyyy-mm-dd where
yyyy is the year, mm is the month, and dd is the day
Sign Reset
SDSI Home Page
Figure 4-4: Issue a Name/Value Certificate
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* SDSI Name 0 Filename
Submit Reset
Certificate Found:
Certificate found binding a public-key principal to the Local Name: MyBob .
Key is an RSA key:
Modulus:
#B8D1C7A2EBCE4EDDD346162129A40451999B28AC7747AC91139B6Fl208-
#9D9A7E6EO471936DBCC1EF1684C5769C4441681FC8FE81A6F5003CD4A6-
#B97AE394F489
Exponent:#11
Server- At: swanlcs.mit,edu thrush.lcs,mit,edu
ACL: (read: ALL!)
Figure 4-5: Search for Principals and Issue Certificates - Certificate Found
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be the extended reference MyBob's Chris-Smith. If Bob has a certificate binding
Chris' principal to the local name Chris-Smith, then the query will be successful,
and a certificate will be displayed, in a similar fashion to the one in Figure 4-5. Alice
can then issue name/value or membership certificates for Chris' public-key principal as
she chooses. For the rest of this example, we assume that she has issued a name/value
certificate for his principal, with the local name MyChris.
Symbolic Definition. Recall that Eve is another MIT student that Alice makes
friends with. Alice wants to create a certificate for Eve also, but instead of explic-
itly searching for Eve's principal, she decides to symbolically define Eve to be MIT's
Eve25. This principal will be well defined if Alice has a certificate which she signed
which binds MIT's public-key principal to the local name MIT, and if this MIT prin-
cipal has a certificate binding Eve's principal to the name Eve25. To make the sym-
bolic definition, Alice will once again go to the Search for Principals and Issue
Certificates page, but she will be able to go straight to the Issue Certificates
section and click on the Issue Symbolic Cert link (without doing any searching).
This page will give her the option to enter a local name, (such as MyEve), the value
MIT's Eve25, and an expiration date.
List Certificates in Cache. As the semester progresses, Alice issues more and
more certificates for the people she meets. She cannot always keep track of all of
them, and one day in particular, she wants to see how many membership certificates
she has issued. To do this she can go to the List Certain Certificates in Your
Cache page from her SDSI Homepage. On this page, she would select Membership,
and then click on the Submit Query button. Figure 4-6 shows this page, and Figure 4-
7 shows the result of this search. Clicking on one of the links shown in Figure 4-7 will
display the fields of the corresponding certificate which, in this case, will include the
group name and the expiration date of the membership certificate.
Group Definition. As a final example, Alice decides to define a SDSI group. She
has discovered that Bob, Chris and Eve all share her love for math, and so she decides
List Certain Certificates in Your Cache
Use this page if you want to see all the certificates in your cache that are of a
certain type, e.g. all your Name/Value certificates. Note that expired
certificates will not be shown.
Select one of the options below:
vName/Value
Membership
vDelegation
vAutocert
SDSI Home Page
Figure 4-6: List Certificates in Your Cache
[] Netscape: Result of Cache Search
Here is the result of your search
Certificate Type
Membership --------------------- >Group: friends
Membership --------------------- >Group: clowns
Membership --------------------- >Group: funny hats
Membership --------------------- >Group: clowns
Figure 4-7: Result of List Certificates in Your Cache
to place them in a group which she calls math_lovers. To do this she goes to the
Define a Group page from her SDSI Homepage. Once she is at this page, she types in
the name of the group, and since she knows exactly who she wants to put in the group,
she can proceed directly to adding names to it. Figure 4-8 shows the appearance of
the screen after Alice has already added Bob and Chris to the group math_lovers,
and is about to add Eve. She does this by entering the name of Eve's principal and
clicking on Submit Request while the Add name to group list button is checked.
Note that the names she enters are the local names that she has bound the public-key
principals to: MyBob, MyChris and MyEve.
When Alice has finished adding members to the group, she can select the Create
the Certificate button, and click on Submit Request. A page will then appear
which lists all the members of the group that she has entered, and which will prompt
her for an expiration date for the certificate. If she then clicks on the Sign button
of this page, the group definition certificate will be added to her cache. Figure 4-9
shows the result of signing the math_lovers group certificate, with an expiration date
of January 12, 1998.
Other. Though these options were not described in detail, similar steps can be
taken for Alice to issue delegation certificates and to search her local cache using a
template which she specifies.
On almost all of the pages, Alice has the option of going straight back to the SDSI
Homepage by clicking on the SDSI Home Page link. Many pages also contain help
page links that the user can click on for more information and instructions.
It should be noted that the SDSI UI does not provide other functionality that
may require the use of public-key certificates, such as email authentication or code
signing. These are applications that can be built on top of the SDSI library, perhaps
in conjunction with the SDSI UI.
Define a Group
From this page you can create groups by issuing a group certificate. If you
already know the name of a principal you wish to place in the group, you may
add it to the list right away. However, you may also first search for principals
you would like to add to your group. Please note that only names can be placed
in this group definition, so any principal you wish to place in a group must have
a Local Name in your namespace, or be defined by an extended reference, such
as Bob 's Alice. If you make a mistake or change your mind about a group
member (before you create the certificate), click on Restarrt the Gruop. You
can also get more information about SDSI groups.
Enter the name of the groucpyou ame creating:
Enter the name of the SDSlprincipai yu woucld like to addlr to the group or
seandz ~fin-
Name:
K> Search on this name k1 Add name to group list
SumtReus Reset
K> Create the certificate
Current Members of the Group List:
MyBob MyChris
Rertan the Group
SDSI Home Pave
Figure 4-8: Defining a Group
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Certificate Signed
The following certificate has been successfully signed and added to
your cache:
Group Name: math_lovers
Members: MyBob MyChris MyEve
Expiration Date: 1998-01-12T00:00:00.000-0000
Figure 4-9: Result of Defining a Group
4.4 Design Choices
4.4.1 Structure
When designing the layout of the pages of the SDSI UI, especially the "Homepage",
I tried to systematically go through all of the different functions that a user might
want to perform, and then arrange them in a suitable way. This sometimes required
making assumptions about the potential behavior of future SDSI users, in order to
come up with a design that would fit their needs. One of the functions that it is
predicted that users will want to perform often is search for SDSI certificates. These
certificates can be divided into two main categories:
1. Certificates that are present locally in the user's cache (most of which will
probably have been issued by the user)
2. Certificates that are remotely located on other SDSI servers. These certificates
can only be obtained by making a query to the appropriate server.
The user will also want to issue certificates for SDSI principals. These could be any
of the three main types, Name/Value, Membership or Delegation. In addition, the
user may want to make group definitions (which are in fact just a special form of
Name/Value certificates).
At certain times, and especially on first using SDSI, the user may obtain a principal
from a file, rather than from a query. This may happen if the user obtains the principal
from a diskette, for example. In this case, there must be a way to load that principal
into the UI.
It is also probable that, at various times, the user will also want to view some of
the certificates in his cache, many of which he may have issued himself. There seemed
to be three ways of doing this which would be useful:
1. Searching for the principal by local name (probably the most useful way).
2. Searching for all the certificates of a given type e.g. all the membership certifi-
cates, or all the name/value certificates.
3. Searching the cache using an arbitrary template, not covered by any of the two
options above e.g. searching based on the Server-At field of a Principal.
Another operation the user may want to perform is find out whether he is a
member of a group that another SDSI user has created. Finally, each SDSI user must
have an Autocert, and there needs to be a way for it to be created and updated.
Looking at all of these options together, it seemed as though they could be grouped
into two broad categories:
1. Functions for which the user might need to contact other SDSI servers. These
included searching for certificates, and making membership queries.
2. Functions which only involved the user's cache and server. These included
viewing certificates that were in the cache, and managing the Autocert.
Following this reasoning, the SDSI Homepage was divided into the Search, Issue,
and Query and Manage Your Local Cache categories, as shown in Figure 4-1.
It is also predicted that many times a user will want search for and view remote
certificates before deciding to issue a certificate for the corresponding principal. For
example, Alice may want to see the certificate that Bob has issued for Chris, because
some of the information it contains may help her with issuing her certificate. For this
reason, the searching and issuing functions were combined together in the Search for
Principals and Issue Certificates page. It also made sense for the user to be
able to search his local cache from this page, using the local name of the principal he is
looking for. In addition, since loading a principal or certificate from a file would yield
basically the same result as doing a query (that result being a public-key principal
or certificate), the option of loading from a file was also placed on the Search for
Principals and Issue Certificates page.
A similar case holds for when the user wants to create a group. Many times he
will want to search (both locally and remotely) for the principals that he wants to add
to the group, and then finally make the group definition. This is why the Define a
Group page, was placed under the Search, Issue, and Query section, rather than
the Manage Your Local Cache section.
At the time this thesis was written, the Membership Query function was not fully
complete in either the SDSI shell or the UI. However, if it were, it would also have
been placed in the Search, Issue, and Query category.
4.4.2 Limiting the UI
During the design of the SDSI UI, some decisions were made to limit how much of the
underlying functionality the user would be able to view or access. In particular, one
of the aims was to hide the user from SDSI's S-expressions as much as possible, and
especially to prevent him from having to type in S-expressions, since this could become
confusing. As it is, only two pages require the user to type S-expressions, where it is
unavoidable. One is the Search Your Certificate Cache page on which the user
types in a template that will be searched on. The other is the Issue Delegation
Cert page, which is found in the Issue Certificates section of the Search for
Principals and Issue Certificates page, where the user is required to enter an
authorization template for the delegation certificate. Both of these pages will probably
only be needed by advanced users of SDSI.
Another design choice was to try to have the user deal only with names, rather
than principals. In particular, a user should never have to type a principal into the UI.
Even within this limitation, however, there are some potential complications. SDSI
has an extremely flexible naming structure, and this raises some issues about how
the UI should deal with names. As an example, suppose Alice wants to search for
the principal that is defined by the extended reference Bob's joan. However, in this
case, Bob has bound joan to the symbolic reference Harvard's joan55, rather than
an explicit principal. In turn, Harvard may have defined its joan55 to be faculty's
joan3. In this case, from Alice's point of view, there are several ways to refer to
joan's public-key principal, which we will denote as <principal-j>. These include:
* Bob's joan
* Bob's Harvard's joan55
* Bob's Harvard's faculty's joan3
* <principal-h>'s joan55
* <principal-h>'s faculty's joan3
* <principal-f>'s joan3
where <principal-h> and <principal-f> are the actual principals of Harvard
and Harvard's faculty, respectively. Though each of the definitions listed above
should end up with the same principal for joan, that being <principal-j>, the
time at which the binding takes place is different in each case, and so they could
give different results depending on whether one of the bindings has changed. As an
example, if the "<principal-f>'s joan3" definition is used, then the result will
change only when <principal-f> changes it's binding for joan3. However, if the
"Bob' s Harvard' s faculty' s j oan3" definition is used, the result will change when
any of these entities changes its bindings. In particular, if the SDSI server of one of
these principals is down, joan's principal will be inaccessible to Alice.
If Alice wanted to issue a certificate for joan, a choice of one of these options would
have to be made. This could get complicated, and possibly confuse the user, so it
might be useful to limit the options somewhat. In the case of this implementation,
part of the choice is already made by the underlying library, which evaluates all the
way to a principal in every possible case. Therefore, given the extended reference
Bob's joan which is defined as described above, the evaluation would not stop un-
til it reached the <principal-j>, which is the only thing that would be returned.
However, the user always has the option of issuing a symbolic certificate using a value
such as Bob's joan. So in effect, Alice has a choice between using the explicit prin-
cipal (<principal-j>) in a certificate, or the top-level symbolic definition (Bob's
j oan). Any of the other extended references could of course be used, but only if Alice
found them out by other means.
A similar issue arises with group definitions. Suppose Bob wants to include (the
public-keys of) Alice, Eve, and Joan in a group. He could potentially use either a
SDSI name or a principal for each of the members. Bob may also want to search for a
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Figure 4-10: The Underlying Architecture
principal before adding it to a group, which once again raises the issue of there perhaps
being multiple definitions of a principal. To reduce these complications, the the UI
only gives the user the option of entering names in the group definition, whether they
are local such as joan or extended references, such as Harvard's joan55. However,
note that actual principals can be indirectly added to a group by issuing membership
certificates for them, using the Search For Principals and Issue Certificates
page.
4.5 The Underlying Architecture
Figure 4-10 illustrates the underlying architecture of the SDSI UI.
When the user types in the command to start up the SDSI UI, a program written
in C, called sdsish (for SDSI shell) starts up. It prompts the user for a password,
and if it is entered successfully, the user's private key (i.e. the private part of the
public-key pair) is unlocked. The user's public-key principal definition is installed
User
into the SDSI library, and that principal becomes the speaker of any actions that
are performed. Sdsish then starts up an HTTP server and launches Netscape (or
an appropriate browser). The HTTP server then runs a CGI script which displays
the user's root SDSI page, the SDSI Homepage. From here on the user only interacts
with Netscape. Depending on the user's actions, other CGI scripts will be launched,
most of which will need to interact with the user's SDSI server and certificate cache.
As an example, the user may want to add a newly created certificate to his cache.
When this occurs, the appropriate CGI script makes a network call back to sdsish.
Sdsish then makes calls to the SDSI library which in turn interacts with the user's
SDSI servers and cache. The results of these calls are passed back to sdsish, which
in turn returns them to the CGI script that called it, which returns the result to the
user, who will view it in Netscape.
The architecture was designed this way in order to allow flexible interaction be-
tween the UI and the library. The SDSI shell (sdsish) provides higher-level func-
tionality than that of the library: whereas the library operates on C objects and
structures, the CGI scripts of the web interface send and receive only text. Sdsish
therefore acts as an intermediary between the CGI scripts and the SDSI library.
Most of the work of this thesis involved writing the CGI scripts which took the
user's queries, passed them to sdsish, and then interpreted the response. Some of
the main steps involved in this implementation are described in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5
Implementation of the SDSI User
Interface
This chapter describes some of the key steps involved in implementing the SDSI User
Interface. It assumes some basic knowledge on the reader's part about HTTP servers
and CGI scripts. A good overview of these topics can be found in "The HTML Source
Book" [6]. All of the code fragments shown in this chapter are written in perl.1
5.1 The Web Server
The SDSI UI uses a web browser as the interface for the user to input requests. The
requests are submitted using HTML forms, and this requires a web (HTTP) server to
be running on the user's machine. The server used in this implementation is NCSA's
httpd.
Running a web server on a machine brings up certain security issues. In this case,
the user should only be running a local process that accepts connections from the
web browser he is currently using to interface to SDSI. Connections should not be
accepted from any other locations. This is especially important with the SDSI UI
because the server will be launching CGI scripts which will perform functions that
'The code for this thesis will be posted at a later date on the SDSI Web Page. [1]
affect the user's SDSI certificates and servers. It would be disastrous if an adversary
could gain access to the web server on the user's machine and thus gain access to his
SDSI cache, perhaps doing damage or viewing sensitive information.
Luckily, the web server can be configured to accept connections only from the
local host i.e. the machine on which the web server itself is running, since this is the
machine on which, presumably, the user will also be running the web browser. This
adjustment will prevent outside adversaries on remote hosts from connecting to the
web server. It does not, however, solve the problem of adversaries that are on the
same machine as the user trying to connect to the web server. The possibility of more
than one user being logged onto the same machine is fairly large, especially in many
of the time-sharing systems that exist today. This problem was solved by using a
security loop, as described in section 5.3.
Launching the web server and setting up the configuration files were eventually
taken over by the SDSI shell (sdsish) which was written as part of "An Implementation
of SDSI" [5] by Matt Fredette. The interaction of the UI and sdsish is described in
more detail in section 5.2.
5.2 Interacting with the SDSI Shell (sdsish)
The SDSI shell is the UI's interface to the SDSI library and by extension, the user's
servers and cache. It can run in two modes, either in command line mode, which
expects typed input from a user, or as a daemon, waiting for network connections
from one of the CGI scripts of the UI. The SDSI shell expects the same form of
commands in both modes. For example, when defining a variable a to be a string,
bob-jones, sdsish expects the string to be followed by a dot on a line by itself. In
command line mode, this would look like:
sdsish> define a
bob-jones
sdsish>
So, if this same command were to be given in the network mode, it would have to be
constructed (in perl) as:
$command = ''define a\nbob-jones\n.\nexit\n'';
The extra "exit\n" at the end is needed when the shell is used in the network
mode to signal the end of the connection.
Another important point about sdsish is that it has a predefined variable called
the speaker, which represents the public-key principal of the user that started up
the UI and entered the corresponding password. This is useful because many of the
commands of sdsish require the principal that is doing the action to be specified, and
this is usually the speaker. To make this more concrete, the following is a typical
command and response that would occur in the SDSI shell (in command-line mode):
sdsish> print speaker
( Principal:
( Public-Key:
( RSA-with-SHA1:
( N:
#B8D1C7A2EBCE4EDDD346162129A40451999B28AC7747AC9-
#6E0471936DBCC1EF1684C5769C4441681FC8FE81A6F5003 )
(E: #11 ) ) )
( Server-At: swan.lcs.mit.edu thrush.lcs.mit.edu ) )
sdsish>
Once a command has been set up, a connection has to be made to sdsish. This is
accomplished by the &connect_tosdsish2 procedure, which establishes a filehandle
to the SDSI shell, called SDSISH. Once this connection has been made, the com-
mand itself is flushed to SDSISH. The script that did this then waits for the shell's
response and interprets it accordingly (this often consists of decomposing a list of
2Thanks to Matt Fredette for providing this code.
certificates into an array of individual ones). This is accomplished by a procedure
called &decomplist.
As an example, suppose the user wants to query his cache for a certificate with
the local name bob. The correct template for this would be (Cert: ( Local-Name:
bob )). The command to be used in sdsish would be of the form get <principal>
<template> where <principal> specifies the public-key that should have signed
the resulting certificate(s), and <template> is the template that the certificate(s)
should match. Putting it all together, to make a query to sdsish, using the template
(Cert: ( Local-Name: bob )), the following would be done in one of the CGI
scripts:
$template = "(Cert: ( Local-Name: bob ))";
$command = "define template\n$template\nget speaker template\nexit\n";
&connect_to_sdsish("SDSISH", $bigcookie);
&printflush(SDSISH, "$command");
($valname, Ocertarray) = &decomplist (SDSISH);
Many of the other function calls to sdsish follow a similar pattern.
5.3 The Security Loop
The security loop is implemented to ensure that only the legitimate user will have
access to his SDSI servers and cache during each session that he interacts with the
SDSI UI. The idea behind the security loop is simple: each time the SDSI UI is
started up, sdsish generates a large random number, and passes it to the web server
via the browser. When an access has to be made to sdsish, it expects to receive this
number first. If it does not, it will not grant any of the user's requests. This should
ensure that only the user that initially started up the UI and sdsish will be able to
gain access to that sdsish. If the number generated by sdsish is sufficiently large and
random, there is a very low probability that an adversary will be able to guess it, and
therefore gain unauthorised access.
To describe the process in more detail, sdsish generates a large random number,
referred to hereon as a cookie, when the user starts up the SDSI UI (a fresh cookie
is generated each time the UI is run). The sdsish passes this cookie to the web server
as a request variable on the first connection to the server, when the root page is
started up. Since it is a request variable, the cookie can be received by the root CGI
script, which is the first page of the UI.
In actual fact, the shell sends not only the cookie, but also the port on which the
web server (which was launched by sdsish) is running, as well as the port on which
sdsish itself is running. The UI scripts need all of this information so that they will
know which port of the local host to connect to for the HTTP server, as well as which
port to connect to when making calls back to sdsish, and this information will change
with each session of use of the UI. The cookie, the HTTP server port, and the sdsish
port are collectively (joined by hyphens) referred to as the bigcookie. So the sdsish
would use a URL like http://localhost:$port/cgi-bin/root?info=$bigcookie
to access the root page of the UI.
As this shows, initially, the root script receives the bigcookie. However, all of the
scripts may potentially use the shell or make a connection to the web server, and so
they need to know the cookie, the HTTP port, and the sdsish port as well. Therefore
the bigcookie is passed between any two scripts that reference each other. This is
accomplished by including it in the URL path of the script that is being referenced.
The bigcookie then appears as the PATHINFO environment variable, and can be
accessed by the referenced CGI script. This script will then split the bigcookie into
its three components, the cookie, the HTTP port, and the sdsish port. The following
lines show some of the perl code that makes this happen. Within a referencing script,
passing the bigcookie will be done by a line such as:
<FORM ACTION="http://localhost : $port/cgi-bin/newscript/$bigcookie">
Then within the referenced newscript, the bigcookie will be received and split by
the following lines of code:
$bigcookie = $ENV{PATH_INFO};
User
Figure 5-1: The Underlying Architecture with Security Loop
$bigcookie =~ s/\/(\w+)/$1/;
($port, $shport, $cookie) = split (/-/, $bigcookie, 3);
In this case $port represents the HTTP port, $shport represents the port of the
SDSI shell, and $cookie represents the cookie, which is a large random number, as
described previously.
Finally, when a script wants to make a call back to sdsish so that some function
can be performed that accesses the user's cache (for example, a Get query), it must
first pass the cookie to it. In actual fact, the entire bigcookie is passed as shown by
the line &connecttosdsish("SDSISH", $bigcookie), which was also mentioned
in Section 5.2. Figure 5-1 illustrates the underlying architecture of the SDSI UI, with
the security loop indicated.
In addition, each time a script is accessed by the web server, it checks that some
cookie was passed properly, and gives an error if not. This check is not totally
necessary, since if a cookie was not passed, then any attempt to use the sdsish would
fail, and the sdsish is the only process that actually touches the user's cache, and
therefore, could potentially do damage. However, the check provides an extra layer
Once the correct cookie has been passed to the sdsish, the rest of the interaction
proceeds as described in section 5.2.

Chapter 6
Discussion and Future Work
This chapter discusses some of the difficulties encountered during the design and
implementation of the SDSI UI, as well as some possible future improvements. It also
outlines some changes that will need to be made for the next version of SDSI, which
is currently in progress.
6.1 Challenges
One of the most challenging aspects of creating the SDSI User Interface was designing
it in a way that made it easy for the user. Even after the implementation details of
connecting to the SDSI shell and interpreting the response from the library had been
worked out, there were still uncertainties about the best way to design the web pages.
One thing I learnt from this thesis work is that user interface design is an art in
itself, and requires a lot of thought. It is important for the user to always know what
state he is in during any given process, and what he can do on each screen that is
presented to him. Part of this can be accomplished by having very clear instructions,
but designing the flow of the pages in a way that is intuitive for the user is also
important.
The challenge of making the UI simple was increased somewhat by SDSI's flexi-
bility. SDSI has a lot of options for the user, and these need to be managed carefully.
As an example, after searching for a certificate on the Search for Principals and
Issue Certificates page as described in Chapter 4, the user has the option of issu-
ing a name/value certificate for the principal that was found, or issuing a membership
certificate for it, or issuing any symbolic certificate, or clicking on the help link, etc.
It is important to keep the user informed about the whole process, regardless of what
choice is made. This can be partly accomplished by carefully and clearly labelling
the HTML page titles, instructions and even the Submit buttons that the user will
click on to send a query to the HTTP server.
In addition, as discussed also in Chapter 4, the SDSI UI is designed with the
average user in mind, and this posed a challenge of designing it in a way that did not
actually assume too much previous knowledge of any person that would be attempting
to use it. Since I knew the SDSI proposal very well by the time I started creating
the UI, this was sometimes difficult to do. Many times I had to step back and put
myself in the shoes of a person who was only vaguely familiar with SDSI, and try to
provide the right amount of support to guide that person through the interface to get
at what he or she wanted to do, or even to discover what that was.
6.2 Future Improvements
As described in Section 6.1, designing the SDSI UI was challenging, and future im-
provements would include making it more user friendly, intuitive, simple, and easy to
use. Part of this process will involve extensively testing the user interface on users,
to see to see how easily they can adapt to it, and then perhaps making even more
design changes.
In addition, there are several ways in which the functionality of the UI could be
improved, though time or some other limitation did not permit it in this implemen-
tation. Some of these functions are briefly described below.
Running the UI remotely. Currently this implementation assumes that the SDSI
shell, HTTP server and web browser, will all run on the same machine. However,
users may want the flexibility of running the UI remotely. This might require some
changes in both the SDSI UI and sdsish.
Revoking Certificates from Servers The UI does not currently give users the
option to "revoke" certificates from their SDSI servers, though this ability is supported
by the underlying library. The result of such a request would be to stop the user's
servers from distributing the specified certificate. This is desirable since users should
have control over the certificates that their servers distribute.
More Flexible Group Definitions. The UI does not give the user the option to
use AND, NOT, MINUS, or ANY in group definitions: the members are automatically
joined together by ORs. However, this default is probably sufficient for much of what
a typical user would want to do. Also, when creating a group, the user cannot delete
individual members, only the whole group at once. Changes to accommodate these
options might be desirable for an implementation of SDSI version 1.0. However, group
certificates are changed extensively in the next version of SDSI, which is outlined in
Section 6.3.
Images. SDSI certificates may include images, however support for this was not
included in either the SDSI shell or the UI.
Standard root support. The SDSI proposal[8] describes certain principals that
are likely to become "standard roots". In addition, DNS Internet email names are
given special status. Explicit support for this was not included in the UI.
Text fragment searching. Users can currently search for certificates by inputting
names, such as bob-jones. The UI would be even more useful if it could support
searches by text fragments such as bo, to find both bob and bob_jones. Function-
ality such as this might require changes in both the underlying library and the user
interface.
Compatibility with other Schemes. It will be useful and perhaps even necessary
for SDSI to have the ability to inter-operate with other public-key certificate formats
such as PGP and X.509. Some work has already been done on converting PGP
public-key rings to SDSI principals in "An Implementation of SDSI"[5]. To that
end, it would be desirable for the user to have the option of importing a certificate
of another type, and perhaps extracting the public key, or converting it into SDSI
format.
More Options When Issuing Certs. Currently, users only have the option of en-
tering a local or group name, and an expiration date when they issue certificates (other
than the Autocert). SDSI certificates can contain other fields such as Description,
and the user should be given the option to enter values for them.
Reverse lookup. If a principal is returned from sdsish (for example, as the signer
of a certificate obtained from a Get query), the actual principal is displayed to the
user, rather than a corresponding name. The only exception to this occurs when
the principal is actually the user's principal, referred to elsewhere as the speaker.
Then, instead of the principal, the user is shown the word YOU. Given that one of the
aims of SDSI is to have users deal with names rather than public-keys, it would be
desirable for the local name associated with a principal to be displayed to the user (if
one exists), rather than the principal itself. This would require a "reverse lookup",
going from a principal to a name in the user's local name space.
ACLs. Each SDSI certificate has an ACL. The UI currently always uses certain
default ACLs when certificates are issued by the user. For membership certificates,
this default is (ACL: (member: ALL!)), and for name/value and auto-certificates,
it is (ACL: (read: ALL! )) (note that this is actually a departure from what was
outlined in the SDSI paper[8]). An improvement would be to give the user the
flexibility to specify other ACLs for the certificates that he signs.
Membership Queries. Membership queries were not fully implemented in the user
interface or the SDSI shell.
Membership Certs. The UI only allows membership certificates to be issued for
actual principals that are obtained via a search, or by loading from a file. It would
be desirable for a user to be able to type in just the local or extended name of a
principal for which he wishes to issue a membership certificate.
Reconfirmation. Users are not presently given the option to enter a reconfirmation
period when they sign certificates.
More Get Query Options. Currently users can only make Get queries to other
servers with the Local-Name: template (which is implied when a search is done by
name). They may in fact want to make more complicated requests using templates
(like they can in their local caches). In particular, a user should be able to make a
request to obtain the Autocert of another user.
GET vs. POST. The UI uses the GET method to submit HTTP requests to
the web server. This is extremely convenient for generating queries on the fly and
passing information between different CGI scripts. However there is a limit to the
amount of data that can be passed using GET (though it is very large). This limit
varies from browser to browser. With POST, however, the amount of data that can
be submitted is unlimited. Since SDSI certificates can become very large, and may
sometimes need to be submitted as the value of a request variable to the server, it
may be safer, though less convenient, to switch from GET to POST.
6.3 The Evolution of SDSI
As discussed in previous chapters, SDSI is a relatively new proposal, and it is still in
development. In particular, the authors of SDSI and SPKI [3] are actively discussing
a merging of the two schemes, since they possess many similarities. This design is
called SPKI/SDSI 2.0. It is also referred to as SPKI 2.0 and SDSI 2.0 This thesis
implements SDSI version 1.0, and a new version may require modifications of the user
interface. Some of the new features of SDSI 2.0 are described below.
SDSI 2.0 unifies all of the different certificate types present in SDSI 1.0 into one
certificate type. Each certificate must contain an issuer, a subject, and a tag,
and optionally, a propagation, and a validity. As in SDSI 1.0, principals can be
referred to either as keys or by names.
Tags. Tags are used to give particular authorizations to the subject of the certificate,
such as the ability to telnet or ftp to a particular Internet address. They are what
SPKI originally called auths. Each certificate has exactly one tag, of the form (tag
T), where T is an arbitrary S-expression. The tag may also contain various *-forms
to indicate the authorization that is being given. Some examples of tags are given
below:
* (tag (*)) which represents the set of all S-expressions, and thus denotes un-
limited transfer of authorization.
* (tag (spend-from 1234)) which denotes authorization to spend from account
1234.
* (tag (spend-from (* set 1234 5678))) which denotes authorization to spend
from either account 1234 or 5678.
* tag (http (* prefix "http://www.abc .com/")) which authorizes http ac-
cess to any web URLs that start with http://www.abc. com/.
* (tag (spend-amount (* range numeric (< 5000)))) authorizes someone to
spend up to 5000 dollars.
There are several other proposed *-forms.
Propagation. Certificates may have a propagation part which specifies the abil-
ity of the subject of the certificate to pass on the authorization given by the tag.
If it does exist, the propagation field always appears in the form (propagation
stop-at-key). This allows arbitrary propagation of the authority of the certificate
through subjects that are names, but stops propagation at the first subject that is a
key.
Validity. Certificates may also contain not-before and not-after fields which
specify the validity period of the certificate.
More information about these and other aspects of the design of SDSI 2.0 can
be found on the SDSI Web Page [1]. Developments such as these will require corre-
sponding changes in the SDSI user interface.

Chapter 7
Conclusion
This aim of this thesis was to provide a prototype implementation of a graphical user
interface for SDSI. Though there are many improvements and additions that could
be made, this goal has been achieved, and the SDSI UI can be used to provide most
of the basic SDSI features. In retrospect, the web-based approach was a success.
Any modifications to the user interface would involve changing the web page design,
not the basic underlying architecture. This SDSI UI presents a working prototype,
however, designing an interface for an inexperienced user to a relatively complicated
system is challenging, and any future work should involve testing the UI from a user's
point of view, which may cause the design to go through even more iterations. SDSI
itself is going through some design changes, and it is hoped that this thesis work can
be used as a basis for future implementations of SDSI.
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